Abstract * This paper's goal is to examine the effect of foreign aid on income inequality and poverty reduction for the period 1971-2002. Since simple cross-country regressions cannot be taken as "true" time series findings we focus on dynamic panel data techniques, which allow accounting for potential simultaneity and heterogeneity problems. We find some weak evidence that foreign aid is conducive to the improvement of the distribution of income when the quality of institutions is taken into account, however, this result is not robust. This finding is consistent with recent empirical research on aid ineffectiveness in achieving economic growth or promoting democratic institutions.
INTRODUCTION
In the post colonial era, foreign aid has been one of the main vehicles for the rich countries to promote better living conditions in less developed parts of the world, alleviation of poverty and narrowing income disparities having been viewed as its main goals. Yet, the effectiveness of foreign aid has been often questioned, much recent research focusing in particular on average growth effects of foreign aid. While Burnside and Dollar, 2000 , qualify the argument that aid can promote growth by the recipient countries having good institutions, in more recent work even this moderate conclusion has been questioned. Thus, Easterly, 2003 , Easterly et al., 2004 , and Rajan and Subramanian, 2005 , claim that there is no evidence of any effect of aid on growth -even when institutional quality is high; and Brautigam and Knack, 2004, and Knack, 2004, argue that aid may, in fact, cause deterioration in the quality of democratic institutions.
Foreign aid, however, may still be beneficial in other respects, for example, by improving the lot of the poorer population segments in receiving countries. It may help to alleviate poverty and equalize income distribution, without necessarily having a discernible average growth effect. While both constitute major objectives of aid giving, to our knowledge, there is surprisingly limited formal empirical evidence on this issue. 1 From a broad brushed look at the data, there appears to be some tentative evidence pointing towards the existence of a relationship between foreign aid and income inequality in the presence of good institutions see Figure 1 . Thus, when corruption is at the bottom third tercile, an increase in foreign aid from low to medium is linked to a 1 Masud and Yontcheva (2005) cite a few references and perform analyses focusing on specific channels of foreign aid and developmental outcomes, such and health indicators; more generally, the recent World Development Report (World Bank, 2006) argues that aid does not seem to have an equalizing effect. Arvin and Barillas, 2002 , employ Granger causality to address causality issues present in the relationship between aid and poverty. reduction in the Gini coefficient from 0.47 to 0.42 approximately; additionally, if foreign aid increases from medium to high, inequality remains relatively stable. The opposite occurs when the level of corruption is at the top higher tercile. When foreign aid increases from low to medium, the Gini coefficient does not change; however, when foreign aid increases from medium to high the Gini increases from 0.43 to 0.46 2 . This possible association between foreign aid and income distribution appears to have motivated policymakers as it is often implicitly assumed that foreign aid has an egalitarian effect despite the fact that there have been little efforts to formally establish it.
FIGURE 1 HERE
Simple correlations and even cross country analyses may, however, be misleading in this context, and appropriate econometric methods to minimize potential endogeneity in the regressors are called for. To the extent possible, our empirical approach is systematic and comprehensive and uses panel methods that try to deal with possible endogeneity problems explicitly (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1997) . We believe that the application of such dynamic panel technique is a valuable contribution to a thorough understanding of the issue at hand. Based on this analysis, we conclude that foreign aid does not appear to have a significant income distribution effect, even in the presence of good institutions. This negative result concurs with the much more extensive literature on aid and growth cited above, as well as with the literature that examines the effect of aid on democratic institutions, see Brautigam and Knack, 2004, and Knack, 2 The link between foreign aid and poverty is less clear, although the relevance of institutions in such link is quite apparent in simple data observation.
2004. Arvin and Barillas, 2002 , also examine the relationship between aid and poverty, using a different econometric tool, the Granger causality. While the two papers are complementary to each other, the advantage of the dynamic panel analysis presented here is that it is a priori agnostic as to the nature of causal relationship between variables.
The next section presents a simple analytical framework that is used to address the link between aid and the welfare of the poor. Section 3 then describes the data used in the paper as well as simple correlations and cross-country regressions. In Section 4 we undertake a more formal empirical analysis. Our findings show that while foreign aid is negatively linked with inequality in the presence of low corruption such outcome does not appear to be particularly robust. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The model
Consider two countries, a poor recipient and a rich donor. The model focuses on the interactions between the governments of the two. Both governments derive utility from objectives that hinge upon the situation in the recipient country. In particular, to tailor the model closer to the ensuing empirical analysis, we assume that both governments care about the distribution of income there, see Boone, 1996 , for related arguments. For analytical simplicity we assume that the recipient country has two income classes and denote e p and e r the market endowments of the two classes, e p < e r , i.e., the respective amounts of income prior to transfers. To avoid dealing with issues involving population size we normalize the size of each group to one. The recipient country's exogenously given budget, normalized to one, is used to transfer income to the population groups; the donor country determines its aid budget A to donate to the poor country. The final income distribution is determined by initial, market endowments supplemented by the transfers, and we denote x p and x r the respective income levels. It is assumed that the domestic government derives utility from the incomes enjoyed by both income groups,
whereas the utility of the donor government derives from the poor income in the recipient country and from transfers to own country's citizens, z:
Both utility functions satisfy standard assumptions.
Including another component in the recipient government's utility, the benefit from aid's diversion to government consumption, would not change the thrust of the results, but would also generate an additional implication that aid effectiveness hinges upon institutions constraining the ability to divert aid. As this is a relatively simple extension of the basic framework, its complete analysis is left outside the main presentation but is available on request.
The donor country's budget, B, is allocated between aid and own transfers,
We distinguish between the case where the donor government provides aid to the recipient government which then allocates it among the income groups, and the one where aid commitment to the poor can be directly made by the donor government.
Analysis
Case 1: Aid is delivered through domestic government 6 The domestic government maximizes the utility (1) subject to the government budget constraint:
where b p and b r denote budget transfers to the poor and the rich, respectively; to the income production constraints:
and to non-negativity constraints:
Ignoring the less interesting corner solution and letting H() denote the demand function for the income of the poor, some standard derivations enable us to write the optimal solution as follows:
so that the increase in the income of the poor as a result of a one dollar aid increase is H'(A+1 + e p + e r ) < 1. For example, when the domestic government's utility is CobbDouglas, V(x p , x r ) = βlog(x p ) + (1-β)log(x r ), 0 < β < ½ , then H(A+1 + e p + e r ) = β (A+1 + e p + e r ) and dx p /dA = β.
Note that imposing constitutional constraints on the amount of transfers to the rich would enhance the effectiveness of aid in reducing inequality by decreasing the extent of aid fungibility. In this regard, the model can be viewed as implying that aid effectiveness hinges upon institutional quality.
The equilibrium amount of aid maximizes then the donor government's utility subject to the budget constraint and to the reaction of the recipient government, and the first order condition is:
For example, when the donor government's utility is Cobb-Douglas, U(x p , z) = αlog(x p ) + (1-α)log(z), 0 < α < 1 , then the above condition can be written as follows:
and the second order condition clearly holds. Totally differentiating (8') we then obtain
which is positive, implying that the amount of aid flows should be positively related to the poor income in the recipient country.
Case 2: Aid can be directly delivered by the donor government
In this case, the domestic government's budget constraint is:
whereas the income production functions are:
When A is large enough, so that the marginal value of further supporting the poor is small from the viewpoint of the donor government, then only transfers to the rich will be made.
The minimal value of A for this to hold is easy to derive: U p (e p +A*, e r +1)/ U r (e p +A*, e r +1) = 1
If, however, A<A* then the poor also receive the domestic government's transfer given by:
In this case, an increase in foreign aid will be offset by a decrease in the domestic government's support for the poor. To determine the magnitude of the net effect we write the transfer allocation problem of the domestic government as maximizing the utility
subject to
The solution to this problem is given by x p = H(1 + e p + A + e r ), and H'(1 + e p + A + e r ) < 1 is the increase in the income of the poor as a result of a marginal increase in foreign aid.
Note that this is the same as if aid could not be directly delivered by the donor government.
The equilibrium amount of aid then maximized the donor government's utility subject to the above reaction function, and the first order condition is as in (8) and, as can be easily shown it increases with the income of the poor, precisely as in the former case.
Summarizing, we obtain Proposition 1. When aid cannot be directly delivered to the poor by the donor government, only a fraction of it reaches the poor; this fraction is higher the less fungible transfers to the rich are. Further, if the amount of aid is not sufficiently large, this is the outcome even when direct delivery of aid by the donor government is feasible because of the crowding out of domestic transfers with foreign aid. Also, the amount of aid flows is positively related to the income of the poor in the recipient country.
These results suggest that, unless it is provided in a large amount, foreign aid is generally unlikely to reach its intended beneficiaries in its entirety and some leaks should be expected; and even when it is directly provided to the poor, domestic government decreases its transfers correspondingly so that the effective amount of total transfers remains the same. Further, these leaks are inversely related to the relative weighting of the poor income by the domestic government, so that, in particular, when it is controlled by rich elites who do not care much about the poor, a small part of foreign aid will reach its destination. Additionally, the equilibrium aid donations are positively related to the income of the poor, so that poverty in the recipient country causes larger aid flows.
PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The data
Our inequality data come from the World Income Inequality Database released by the United Nations (2006) 3 . These data are based on household surveys; also, the population and income coverage are comprehensive, and different criteria from various sources are homogenized in order to avoid problems of definition 4 . In particular, we use the Gini Index as a measure of inequality which is available for 111 countries from 1970 to 2005.
Additionally, our poverty proxies come from a recently released data set by the World Bank, estimated using a program developed by Chen and Ravallion (2000) and based on primary data information from 454 household surveys covering 97 developing countries.
Following Chen and Ravallion (2000) , the data were standardized using purchasing power parity estimates for consumption produced by the World Bank (2004 6 ). We were able to estimate tri-annual poverty indicators of the generic class of additive indices proposed by Foster et. al. (1984) for the period 1981-2001 7 .
In particular, we use the so-called poverty headcount index, the poverty gap where, x is a non-negative parameter, z is the poverty line or the threshold income/consumption below which someone is considered poor, and y i is a measure of living standard. We use three poverty measures, when x = 0, 1, and 2. 8 See Atkinson, 1987 , for a comprehensive discussion of poverty measures and how they are related to inequality measures. 9 Interestingly, the correlation between official development assistance and effective development assistance is extremely high, about 0.94, obtained by regressing official development assistance on concept of aid is based on country aid commitments, which reflect firm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by the necessary funds, undertaken by an official donor to provide specified assistance to a recipient country or a multilateral organization.
Bilateral (Gastil, 1990 ) and the ICRG data (ICRG, 2006) to obtain estimates of corruption from 1973 to 1981 by running a simple bivariate regression between these two variables since the simple correlation between them is negative and statistically significant at one percent. A similar employed in our analysis are real gross domestic product per capita, the inflation rate, liquid liabilities, and the literacy rate (World Bank, 2006) . Table 1 provides detailed definitions of all the variables employed; Table 2 presents basic summary statistics; and Table 3 shows simple correlation among variables.
TABLES 2 AND 3 HERE
A FIRST APPROXIMATION: CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE
We first take a simplistic approach and run cross-country regressions. In the case of income inequality we take simple averages for the period 1972-2001 for each variable and run cross-country regressions in the spirit of Barro (1991) by postulating the following specification:
where y i represents income inequality, as proxied by the Gini coefficient 12 . Similarly, X i represents the matrix of basic controls which includes the level of initial gross domestic product per capita in 1972, the literacy rate, liquid liabilities (M3) as a percentage of gross domestic product, and the inflation rate. Additionally, S i represents the matrix of our variables of interest, that is, a proxy for institutions and either of the three measures of foreign aid described above. We use the latest inequality measure available for each country in order to minimize potential endogeneity. For the case of poverty measures we take the same approach as above, but because of the more limited data the variables are averaged from 1980 to 2001, only. The basic empirical specification is suggested by the method was applied by Barro (1991) . Nevertheless, reducing the sample to go from 1982 to 2002 does not change the results. 12 We also tested changes instead of levels. Results are never statistically significant. available literature on inequality and poverty (Deininger and Squire, 2004; Li, et al., 1998; World Bank, 2004, and others) . On the right hand side, we consider foreign aid relative to gross domestic product and corruption as key explanatory variables. We also include liquid liabilities, the inflation rate, the initial gross domestic product per capita, the literacy rate, and continental dummies. Table 4 shows our basic results. All foreign aid variables yield coefficients that have negative signs which are statistically significant at conventional levels. Also we find that the interactive term between aid and corruption yields the expected sign and is statistically significant 13 . Aid appears to be associated with income inequality in the context of good institutions, as measured by low corruption, only. Notice that whereas the corruption variable by itself does not yield the expected positive sign, this finding is economically irrelevant, as the variable is never statistically significant regardless of the foreign aid measure used 14 . 
TABLE 4 HERE
TABLE 5 HERE
DYNAMIC PANEL DATA APPROACH
The cross-country findings above are likely to be biased due to common problems of simultaneity and reverse causation that may arise because income inequality and poverty may be affected by foreign aid, as well as aid allocation may be driven by poverty and income inequality. The analytical framework indicates that disentangling the causality relationship between aid and income distribution could be difficult, as aid flows are expected to be higher into countries with particularly high levels of poverty, as well as to cause changes in income distribution. Econometrically, a panel data approach should help resolve the causal aid effect on poverty and inequality. In this regard, some previous theoretical and empirical research on related issues gives some guidance on the most appropriate methodology to follow. Previous panel data research shows that inequality has been highly stable in recent decades (Li et al., 1998) , and that the correlation of inequality between the 1960s and 1980s has hovered around 0.85. Further, the average ratio of incomes of the richest five percent to the poorest five percent across countries has 15 We tested a very broad range of specifications and the results do not change. Poverty measures remain barely moved, from 33.2 in 1960 to 31.7 in 1985 (Bruno et al., 1998) . Likewise, there are several studies have pointed out the persistence of poverty in developed and developing countries (Bane and Elwood, 1986; Huff, 1999; Wright, 1992; Hoynes et. al., 2006) . This suggests that both income inequality and poverty are persistent series. Past levels of inequality and poverty may be important predictors of current levels of income inequality and poverty, respectively, which is likely to bias the cross section findings.
A reasonable alternative to dealing with the problem of persistence as well as with that of endogeneity is to use a dynamic panel specification. The use of a dynamic specification introduces potential problems of serial correlation in the error process. The presence of serial correlation is important not only because of its implications in testing the validity of the instruments used in the regression analysis but also because of its impact on the consistency of the estimates. As suggested by the literature (Loayza et al.
2000)
, the modeling strategy for panel data equations with autoregressive errors consists in specifying a dynamic regression with uncorrelated disturbances, which implies the need for the lagged value of the dependent variable as an additional control. Taking into account the particular characteristics of the series under examination, we consider as the most suitable estimation method the fixed effects dynamic panel data GMM-IV techniques (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1997) . By using this method we estimate a regression equation in differences and a regression equation in levels simultaneously, with each equation using its own specific set of instrumental variables.
Notice that by applying this method, there is no need to account for fixed effects explicitly as the estimation is testing for differences 16 .
statistically insignificant to foreign aid. 16 This approach has been used by Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Rajan and Subramanian (2005) in the context of the link between foreign aid and economic growth.
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on whether lagged values of the explanatory variables are valid instruments in the regression. We address this issue by considering two specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) Table 6 shows the results when using the dynamic panel data method described above. We find a negative sign for our variable of interest, although it is not statistically significant. Further, we find evidence on the link between foreign aid and corruption with respect to income inequality, as shown by the interactive term 17 .
However, in the case of our preferred foreign aid measure, the coefficient of the interactive term is statistically significant at ten percent only, and it is not very robust to changes in specification 18 .
TABLE 7 HERE
Using similar specifications, we also test for the association between foreign aid and poverty. Table 7 shows the coefficients and standard errors of our variables of interest 19 . Even though we find the expected signs for our variables of interest as well as for the interactive terms between foreign aid and corruption, the resulting coefficients are not statistically significant in most cases, with the exception of regressions that use the aid commitment, the weakest measure of the three used in this paper, as a proxy for foreign aid. Furthermore, the overall effect of foreign aid on poverty is not statistically significant in most of the cases. 17 We also tested both the Theil inequality measure as well as several dimensions of the Atkinson inequality index obtaining very similar results. 18 In the case of the interaction between corruption and aid commitment we obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient at five percent. When testing additional institutional variables we obtain mixed results, similar as in the cross-section as only about twenty percent of the additional case are statistically significant at conventional levels (also, see footnote 12)
In general, the validity of our set of instruments is confirmed by the two tests proposed. The first test, the Hansen test of over identification of restrictions is rejected for both the inequality and poverty regressions. At the same time, we find that the error terms of our differenced equations follow an autoregressive process of first order, but not of second order, which implies that the error terms of the levels equation does not follow an autoregressive process. Also, the hypothesized dynamic structure of the model is confirmed by the highly significant and positive coefficients of the first lag of our dependent variable 20 .
CONCLUSIONS
This paper contributes to the literature on aid effectiveness by examining the effect of aid on income distribution and poverty. While these constitute the primary objectives of foreign aid, research on how their achievement is affected by foreign aid is very scarce.
We focus on both the direct effect of aid and on how this effect is possibly mediated by recipient countries' institutions, trying to carefully deal with endogeneity concerns.
In line with the recent line of research that discerns failures of foreign aid to promote growth even in the presence of good institutions (e.g., Easterly, 2003, and Easterly et al., 2004) or to enhance the quality of democratic institutions (Brautigam and Knack, 2004, and Knack, 2004) , we find that aid by itself does not appear to have a statistically significant effect on inequality and poverty reduction. While both our simple cross-section approach and our dynamic panel estimation seem to suggest that good 19 Full regression results are available upon request. 20 Results are robust to changes in specification, as well as to different lag structures of the equations and sets of instrumental variables. Furthermore, in the instrumental variable matrix we also include external instruments, in particular, legal origin and a linguistic fractionalization index. Exclusion of all the external instruments does not change our results. Also, notice that poverty and inequality persistence are unconditional on the presence of other regressors.
institutions may be necessary for aid to reach the poor, we fail to detect any robust impact of foreign aid in this regard, even when institutional quality is taken into consideration.
Whereas these results complement the existing ones that deal with the growth effects of aid, the urgency of the examined objectives makes the apparent ineffectiveness of aid appear even more dramatic. In addition to the Head Count and Poverty Gap Indices, a third measure which better reflects changes in the severity of poverty is the Squared Poverty Gap Index. This is defined similar to the Poverty Gap Index except that the poverty gaps are squared, thus giving the highest weighting to the largest poverty gap. The need for this Index arises because the Poverty Gap Index may not adequately capture concerns over distribution changes within the poor. For example, if a policy resulted in money transfer from someone just below the poverty line to the poorest person, the Squared Poverty Gap Index will reflect this change, while the Poverty Gap Index will not. Source: PovcalNet (World Bank). See Chen and Ravallion (2004) Index for Corruption. It ranges from zero to one, increasing with higher risks of corruption. Assessment of the corruption within the political system. The most common form of corruption met directly by business is financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans. It is also more concerned with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business.Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2006) Policy Good policy index. Constructed following the methodology by Burnside and Dollar (2000) .
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Low
Value added in the agricultural sector Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs.
It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Source: World Development Indicators. Value added in the industrial sector Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC divisions 15-37). It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Source: World Development Indicators.
Language
Shares of languages spoken as "mother tongues", generally based on national census data. Source: Alesina et al. (2003) . UK legal origin Dummy equals one if country has common law origins, zero otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1998 (p-value) 0.67 0.74 0.55 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients shown come from regressions using the same specification as those shown in Table 6 .
